

Undiplomatic History: New Histories of Canada in the World

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International history, or the historical study of foreign policy, diplomacy, and international relations, has become marginalized in Canada and it is time to fix the problem.¹ This initiative is part of a growing conversation in Canadian history more generally meant to achieve this same aim. As David Meren has outlined in his recent reassessment of the sub-field's historiography, international history in Canada underwent a period of crisis and stagnation in the late twentieth century that resulted in a number of tragedies, not least of which was a lack of critical engagement on the part of Canadians with the international relationships that defined Canada's past as well as its post-9/11 present. According to Meren, this stasis, not only impeded "the emergence of a narrative capable of challenging established orthodoxies" but led both "to romanticized notions of Canada's international action" and to "the lack of an effective countervailing voice" to oppose the way in which Canadian international history was used "for reactionary ends", such as support for the war in Afghanistan (from 2001-2014).² In comparison to the United States, where the War on Terror coincided with – or led to – a revival of diplomatic history and to historians' engagement in vigorous public debates about the nature and direction of US foreign policy, the diminution of

¹ Although "diplomacy" is but a subset of international history, "diplomatic history" is often used interchangeably for "international history." We prefer the term international history for its greater flexibility and inclusiveness, but we will also sometimes refer to diplomatic history as one and the same, particularly when referring to US literature, where it is far more common to use both terms.

² David Meren, "The Tragedies of Canadian International History," *Canadian Historical Review* 96, no. 4 (December 2015), 537-38. See also the responses to Meren's essay by John English, Adam Chapnick, and Dominique Marshall in the same issue.

Canadian international history, and the marginalization of its practitioners, contributed to a paucity of historical input into debates about Canada's contemporary global engagement.

Meren is hardly alone in lamenting the “tragedy” of what had happened to both the practice and understanding of international history in Canada. Indeed, such laments have a long pedigree. “To know themselves”, the Commission on Canadian Studies contended as early as 1975, “Canadians must have a knowledge and understanding of the international context in which their country has developed and exists ... To know ourselves we must know others and be able to see ourselves in relation to others.” The problem then, Commissioner Thomas Symons noted, was that in Canadian universities, knowledge about Canadian foreign policy and Canadian perspectives on international affairs were sorely lacking.³ The Commission's conclusion might seem odd, given that in the 1970s Canadian political history, of which diplomatic history was a part, dominated the field. Yet very soon, Canadian foreign relations history became one of the chief casualties of the ‘history wars’ that raged in academia in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1986, John English wrote that “In reviewing recent political history, one is struck by the fact that so much political history is now written by political scientists, not historians,” and that this situation was especially so with regard to the history of Canadian international relations.⁴ Nearly ten years later, Robert Bothwell, the dean of Canadian diplomatic historians, lamented that the number of Canadian foreign policy historians was “by recent scientific estimate . . . about the same as the digits on the feet of a three-toed sloth.”⁵ More recently, Adam Chapnick asked: “Where Have All of Canada's Diplomatic

³ T.H.B. Symons, *To Know Ourselves: The Report of the Commission on Canadian Studies* (Ottawa: Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada, 1975), 85-88.

⁴ John English, “The Second Time Around: Political Scientists Writing History,” *Canadian Historical Review* 67, no. 1 (1986), 7.

⁵ Robert Bothwell, “Journey to a Small Country: Only in Canada You Say? Pity,” *International Journal* 50, no. 1 (1994-5), 128.

Historians Gone?” In his view, the decline of this field was doubly regrettable given that, with Canada’s involvement in the Afghan war having seemingly altered Canada’s role on the world stage as well as Canadians’ views of that role, there was a great need for specialists in foreign policy to weigh in with sage historical advice as a guide for future trajectories.⁶ While Meren, English, Bothwell, and Chapnick might differ in their views on Canada’s role abroad, what unites them – and us – is the sense that the historical study of Canadian global engagement is vital and that the relative lack of attention to this history is lamentable. Hence, this initiative represents an effort to chart a way forward toward a revived, forward-looking, inclusive field of Canadian international history, which we call the study of Canada in the World.

To begin with, while it is not our intention to revisit – or worse, to reignite – the history wars (nor to induce Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms in that conflict’s veterans), it is worth briefly noting how the field has fared over the past few decades.⁷ Viewed – rightly, in many ways – as hidebound, elitist, and overly concerned with the state and the small group of white males who dominated it, diplomatic history went by the wayside in Canada. Following the history wars, traditional diplomatic and political historians found themselves largely defeated. As one history war combatant put it, “the battle has been won. With a few grumpy exceptions, the university professoriate has been won over to a more inclusive history.”⁸

Not that Canadian diplomatic historians disappeared. Rather, many practitioners continued

⁶ Adam Chapnick, “Where Have All of Canada’s Diplomatic Historians Gone?,” *International Journal* 65, no. 3 (2010), 725-37.

⁷ For those interested in a historiographical review of Canadian international history, we suggest Meren’s “The Tragedies of Canadian International History.”

⁸ Christopher Dummitt, “After inclusiveness: The future of Canadian history,” in *Contesting Clio’s Craft: New Directions and Debates in Canadian History*, eds., Christopher Dummitt and Michael Dawson (London: Institute for the Study of the Americas, 2009), 102. Note that this collection lacks a chapter on Canadian international history.

to serve, not in history departments, but in interdisciplinary departments and research centres. Moreover, even as their numbers shrank they continued to publish, to train grad students, and to teach courses on international history, a subject matter that retained considerable popularity with undergraduates.⁹ But they became a small, relatively insular community of scholars, relegated to the sidelines of Canadian history, rarely appearing at the Canadian Historical Association annual meetings, and publishing in highly specialized journals rather than in the *Canadian Historical Review*. The passing of Canadian foreign policy history seemed to reflect a wider trend in the 1990s and early 2000s of a lack of engagement with the world on the part of Canada and of Canadians more generally. The title of one polemic from the turn of the millennium put it succinctly: *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World*.¹⁰

But there are signs that this insularity on the part of the Canadian public (if it ever really existed) is ending. As Justin Trudeau announced in October 2015 in his first press conference as prime minister: “I want to say this to this country's friends around the world: Many of you have worried that Canada has lost its compassionate and constructive voice in the world over the past 10 years. Well, I have a simple message for you on behalf of 35 million Canadians. We’re back.”¹¹

⁹ Carrying the torch for Canadian international history, Robert Bothwell, Norman Hillmer, and John English have continued producing excellent scholarship and providing vital mentorship to younger historians.

¹⁰ Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2003).

¹¹ Jessica Murphy, “Canada to end airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, new prime minister Trudeau says,” *The Guardian* (21 October 2015). It is also worth noting, of course, that Stephen Harper said almost exactly the same thing, with opposite implications, shortly after he took office in 2006. As David Meren points out, “Upon coming to power, the Harper Conservatives trumpeted that ‘Canada was back’ on the world stage and employed the war in Afghanistan to ‘re-brand’ Canada and its foreign affairs, including reviving elements of its imperial and military past as part of the national(ist) iconography.” See Meren, “The Tragedies of Canadian International History,” 560. See also, Jessica Chin, “Justin Trudeau’s Not the First Prime Minister to Say ‘Canada Is Back,’” *Huffington Post Canada* (1 December 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2015/12/01/canada-is-back-trudeau-harper_n_8688282.html.

Perhaps it took the recent conservative revolution in foreign policy to refocus Canadian attention on the world and their place within it. Or, perhaps the culprit was the collective impact of the war in Afghanistan, the wider ‘War on Terror’, climate change, the 2008 financial crisis, and the ongoing process of globalization, with its attendant economic, cultural and social effects. These events and developments underscore Canada’s connectivity with the world and indicate the need to study Canada’s place within it.

And things are changing in the academy as well. Canadian historians are more accepting of outward looking scholarship, for transnational and global history have thrived over the past decade or so. Moreover, Canadian diplomatic historians have begun to adopt a more inclusive outlook. Just as a new political history has arisen to explore the confluence of politics, society, and culture in Canada, there has been a growing trend toward a new, vibrant Canadian international history.¹² One of the goals of this collection is to highlight how this sub-field is becoming reinvigorated, and to point the way forward for scholars interested in Canadian foreign relations broadly conceived. And we do mean broadly. For as is clear, or should be clear, from migration to the environment, from peace to war, from trade to human rights, and from identity formation to cultural transfer, the world matters to Canada and to the study of Canadian history. Beyond emphasizing the obvious importance of international, transnational, and global frameworks to our understanding of Canada’s past, another goal of this initiative is to query what separates these different approaches to the study of Canada in the world and, in fact, to point the way forward for

¹² The new political history of Canada is connected to the Canadian Historical Association’s Political History Group. For representative works, see: Matthew Hayday, *Bilingual Today, United Tomorrow: Official Languages in Education and Canadian Federalism* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005); Marcel Martel, *Not This Time: Canadians, Public Policy and the Marijuana Question, 1961-1975* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2006); Penny Bryden, *‘A Justifiable Obsession’: Conservative Ontario’s Relations with Ottawa, 1943-1985* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

a holistic, inclusive approach. Thus, our final aim is to encourage a more rigorous approach to a new international history, one that assesses some of the theoretical implications behind the revolution that has occurred elsewhere and that is now happening in Canadian international history.

In sum, the time has come to take stock of these changes and to consider what new directions in Canadian international history mean for the study of Canada in the World more generally. To do so, it is worth first turning our attention to other historiographies that have been wrestling with similar questions. To do so, we look at international history through the lens of that most Canadian of frameworks, the North Atlantic Triangle of Britain, Canada, and the United States. In all three countries, diplomatic history experienced a period of decline, but whereas international history in both British and US has experienced a renaissance of sorts, in Canada the process of renewal is still in its nascent stage.

International, Transnational, and Global History and the United States in the World

Canadian international history has a long pedigree, harkening back to professional history as it emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century. Here, diplomatic history was of prime importance. Concerned with Great Powers (always capitalized), with peace and war, with international treaties, and with diplomats and statesmen, diplomatic historians searched for an understanding of why conflicts among states occurred, how international crises or disputes were resolved without warfare, and how wars were brought to an end. And in a Europe in which the nation state was of paramount importance, where martial values were prized, and where a narrow elite held sway, such a limited focus on states and statesmen seemed natural. In many respects then, diplomatic

history was history. As Donald Cameron Watt, the dean of British international historians in the 1970s and 1980s, put it in looking back on an earlier era, “to be a historian of nineteenth-century Europe and not a diplomatic historian was almost impossible.”¹³ Nor did two world wars seem to alter the primacy of diplomatic history, at least given its association with political history (though the political science sub-field of International Relations, which arose in the wake of the First World War, became of primary importance in policy-making circles).

Yet by the 1960s, diplomatic history was facing considerable criticism. Given its prioritization of the state – diplomatic historians, like the actors of “high diplomacy” whom they study, have a persistent tendency to personify states – the field was wedded to the nation and to the archive. It was also elite-focused, largely narrative in its construction, and prized empirical evidence over theory, all of which led critics to dismiss its “Rankean exegesis.”¹⁴ As the academy shifted away from elites, the state, and the archive toward common people, social forces, and theory, diplomatic history seemed outmoded and fusty. Thus, in Britain in the 1970s a move started to broaden the field in order to take greater account of the underlying factors that influence state-to-state relations. What soon became known as international history tended to involve a broader focus that encompassed not just diplomacy, but also economic matters, intelligence, strategy, the domestic sources of foreign policymaking, and the role of ideology. Situating international relations into wider societal contexts also became key.¹⁵ While this move on the part of

¹³ Donald Cameron Watt, “Some Aspects of A.J.P. Taylor’s Work as Diplomatic Historian,” *Journal of Modern History* 49, no. 1 (1977), 22.

¹⁴ Charles S. Maier, “Marking time: the historiography of international relations”, in *The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States*, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 357.

¹⁵ Zara Steiner, “On writing international history: chaps, maps and much more,” *International Affairs* 73 (1997), 531-46. And see excellent works reflecting this type of international history: Patrick Finney, ed. *Palgrave Advances in International History*, ed. Patrick Finney (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Marc Trachtenberg, *The Craft of International History: A Guide to*

international historians was a genuine effort to be more inclusive and to do more than simply recount ‘what one clerk wrote to another,’ to its critics the alteration seemed to be purely cosmetic. Thus international history remained subject to “condescension and apathy” and continued to be seen as “the most arid and sterile of all the sub-histories,” judgments levelled even at international historians offering the sorts of critical analyses favoured in the increasingly more leftward tilting academy.¹⁶ While the concern among many international historians was that their field continued to risk “ossification,” some took a more benign view. Given international history’s enduring popularity with undergraduates, with book publishers, and even with the public, Jessica Gienow-Hecht scolded her fellow international historians for being “A global group of worriers.”¹⁷ Still, a crisis seemed evident given that the field was increasingly under attack from – or worse, ignored by – social and cultural historians. Furthermore, a shift was taking place, with other historians, who actively rejected an ‘international’ label, stepping into the breach to craft outward facing history of a different sort.

In parallel with globalization, which questioned the importance of the nation state, the 1990s saw the emergence of transnational and global history. Largely ignoring individual states, transnational and global historians looked in broader terms at how people in one area of the globe viewed, reacted to, or were influenced by events, people, or ideas in another area of the world. Their major preoccupations have been the analysis of processes of migration, transportation, and

Method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Gordon Martel, ed., *A Companion to International History 1900-2001* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).

¹⁶ Gordon Craig, “The Historian and the Study of International Relations,” *American Historical Review* 88, no. 1 (1983), 2; Arthur Marwick, *The Nature of History*, Third Edition (London: Macmillan, 1989), 94.

¹⁷ Patrick Finney, “International History, Theory, and the Origins of the Second World War,” *Rethinking History* 1, no. 3 (1997), 375; Jessica Gienow-Hecht, “A Global Group of Worriers,” *Diplomatic History* 26, no. 3 (2002), 481-91.

communication and of the development of networks, imaginaries, and identities. Exploring relationships between people, the spread of ideas, and how events that occur in one place have significance elsewhere, transnational historians search for “unexpected points of congruence and similarities of discourse in seemingly disparate sites” and look to “highlight historical processes and relationships that transcend nation states and that connect apparently separate worlds.”¹⁸ Generally, states are still present in transnational history, but what is important is to look beyond national borders. As one scholar put it, transnational history looks at “how people and ideas and institutions and cultures moved above, below, through, and around, as well as, within the nation state.”¹⁹ Thus, for transnational historians the state matters, but only just. Global historians, too, leave little room for the state. Involving a process of integrating the histories of various regions, peoples, and even time periods, global history – and its closely related kin, oceanic, imperial, and comparative history – looks far beyond the state. Thus some historians have likened it to globalization itself, noting that they both are processes aimed at “integrating nations and peoples – politically, economically, and culturally – into larger communities”, with a focus, “not on nations, but on the entire globe.”²⁰ If transnational history is about subverting borders, then global

¹⁸ Ann Laura Stoler, “Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies,” *Journal of American History* 88 (2001), 829-65; Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake, eds., *Connected Worlds: History in Transnational Perspective* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2006), 5.

¹⁹ David Thelen, “The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History”, *Journal of American History* 86 (December 1999), 1965-75. Some proponents of transnational history have cautioned wisely about eliminating the state altogether. The late Chris Bayly, who championed efforts to trace the “interconnectedness and interdependence of political and social changes across the world”, also emphasized that “the ‘nations’ embedded in the term ‘transnationalism’ were not originary elements to be ‘transcended’”: Chris Bayly, *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Comparisons and Connections* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 1; Chris Bayly et al., “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History”, *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (December 2006), 1449.

²⁰ Alfred E. Eckes Jr. and Thomas W. Zeiler, *Globalization and the American Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1. As some have pointed out, transnational and

history is about subsuming them into much larger narratives and analyses. Given that, by definition, international history is concerned with relations among states, it would seem to be deeply at odds with the transnational and global turns.

Yet international historians need not be fearful of other approaches to outward-facing history. After all, transnational history, global history, and international history draw on a similar toolkit, namely multi-archival, multi-sited research. Moreover, they are each focused beyond any single state, albeit in different ways. Furthermore, many of the issues that concern these fields are similar, and they include: migration, the environment, global governance, trade, human rights, and the impact of warfare. Hence, our belief is that international, transnational, and global historical perspectives can complement one another effectively. Further, cultural analyses, that incorporate, for instance race, class, gender, or religion, can provide additional richness to international history by allowing historians to delve into the underlying factors that influence foreign policy-making. Indeed, here, the American experience is instructive (even for Canadians, who might naturally be wary of something emanating from our southern neighbours).

In 1977, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), a small professional organization, launched its flagship journal, *Diplomatic History*. The journal's mission statement had spelled it out as "a forum for discussion of many aspects of the diplomatic, economic, intellectual and cultural relations of the United States."²¹ This was an admirable focus, but, in practice, the journal, like the field of diplomatic history writ large, concerned itself mainly with states, elites, and traditional diplomatic issues, even as the American academy shifted toward

global history, particularly in relation to the history of empire, has a long, if unacknowledged pedigree; for a discussion of this point as it relates to Canada, see: Paula Hastings and Jacob A.C. Remes, "Empire, Continent and Transnationalism in Canadian History: Essays in Honor of John Herd Thompson," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 45, no. 1 (2015): 1-7.

²¹ Paul S. Hulbo, "Editor's Note," *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 1 (1997), vi.

social and then cultural history. Furthermore, *Diplomatic History* and American diplomatic history were utterly dominated by debate among an orthodox school, a revisionist school, and a post-revisionist school, which fought a vicious running battle over both American culpability for the Cold War and, more generally, the direction of US foreign policy. The result was that the field of American foreign relations history drifted into obscurity and irrelevance. It entered, as a leading diplomatic historian put it, a “long crisis of confidence” that would be all too familiar to Canadian international historians.²² Yet, American foreign relations history soon revitalized itself by taking seriously the need to incorporate the transnational, global, and cultural turns. The result has been an innovative field of study (perhaps the most innovative sub-field of United States history) that situates international relations within domestic and global contexts, while highlighting and analyzing the economic, political, social, cultural, and even emotional tensions that shape foreign policy-making. Further, American international historians have focused, too, on the role of non-state actors, from missionaries and student radicals, to athletes and musicians, while also looking at global phenomena such as migration flows and the environment.

The shift began in the mid-1990s. With transnational and global history emerging alongside cultural history, in 1997 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, author of a path-breaking study of the Peace Corps, identified an emerging “New Diplomatic History” that took into account these emerging trends to make “a fuller representation of American life by portraying the interaction between the United States and the rest of the world and then tightly braiding that story together with both domestic and world history.”²³ The New Diplomatic History that Cobbs Hoffman outlined would

²² Michael Hunt, “The Long Crisis in US Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure,” in *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, ed., Michael J. Hogan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 93.

²³ Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, “Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: Toward a Global American History,” *Diplomatic History* 21, no. 4 (Fall 1997), 500.

become better known as America in the World or the United States in the World (as Canadians, concerned as we are with not being overshadowed in our own hemisphere, our preference is for the latter), a blending of international, transnational, and global history, along with scholarship reflecting the cultural turn. In short, historians of US foreign relations took an inclusive approach that enlivened and enriched their field. Thus, there quickly developed a considerable literature on race and US foreign policy, which was soon joined by gender-based analyses.²⁴ More recently, religion has emerged as an important frame for analysis, as have business and labour histories that emphasize the symbiosis between US corporations and United States foreign policy.²⁵ A similar move traced development, technology, and modernization and their relation to US power.²⁶

²⁴ On race, see: Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights* (Princeton, 2001); Michael L. Krenn, *Black Diplomacy: African-American and the State Department, 1945-1969* (New York, 1999); Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, MA, 2001); Azza Salama Layton, *International Politics and Civil Rights Policies in the United States, 1941-1960* (Cambridge, MA, 2000); Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960* (Chapel Hill, 1996); Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Ithaca, 1997); Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., *Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988* (Chapel Hill, 2003). On gender, see: Robert Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001); Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

²⁵ For religion, see: Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2012); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Jonathan P. Herzog, *The Spiritual-Industrial Complex: America's Religious Battle against Communism in the Early Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For business and labour studies, see: Jason Colby, *The Business of Empire: United Fruit, Race, and U.S. Expansion in Central America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Daniel Bender and Jana Lipman, eds. *Making the Empire Work: Labor and United States Imperialism* (New York: NYU Press, 2015); Jana Lipman, *Guantánamo: A Working-Class History Between Empire and Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009); Greg Grandin, *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2009).

²⁶ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill, 2000); Michael Adas, *Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America's Civilizing Mission* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Belknap, 2006); David Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham, eds., *Staging*

Moreover, culture itself, understood in this context as consumer goods, radio, art, music, film, and television, has been both a major United States export but also a vital import, and thus historians have stressed the reciprocal nature of cultural transfer between the United States and the rest of the world.²⁷ A related trend has been to look at public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy included, through which US officials sought to use various media and educational and cultural exchanges to spread ideals about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.²⁸ Of course, ideas diffuse widely,

Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003); Matthew Connelly, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008); Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); and Michael E. Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

²⁷ For overviews, see: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, "Shame on US? Academics, Cultural Transfer, and the Cold War – A Critical Review," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2000), 465-94 and Kristin Hoganson, "Stuff It: Domestic Consumption and the Americanization of the World Paradigm," *Diplomatic History* 30, no. 4 (2006), 571-94. And see: Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Bernhard Rieger, "From People's Car to New Beetle: The Transatlantic Journeys of the Volkswagen Beetle," *Journal of American History* 97 (2010), 91-115; Kristin Hoganson, "Cosmopolitan Domesticity: Importing the American Dream, 1865-1920," *American Historical Review* 107 (2002), 55-83; Richard Kuisel, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994); Uta G. Poiger, *Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). Victoria De Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One, You've Seen the Mall: European and American Mass Culture* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996).

²⁸ For general overviews of US public diplomacy, see: Laura A. Belmonte, *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War* (University Park, 2008); Nicholas J. Cull, *The Cold War and United States Information Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-1989* (Cambridge, 2008). For works that look at cultural diplomacy, see: Penny von Eschen, *Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Reinhold Wagnleitner and Elaine Tyler May, eds., *Here, There, and Everywhere:*

and so scholarly attention has also been devoted to how Americans have received ideas from abroad, and also at how American ideas were received abroad.²⁹ That the United States in the World could cast such a wide net may seem too much (a sign, perhaps, of the American tendency for excess?), and yet it is clear that power dynamics – the ultimate concern of diplomatic history – lie at the heart not only of typical foreign policy issues of peace and war but are central to questions of gender and race, culture and economics, and modernity and religion. So, among US foreign relations scholars it became natural to show how “beliefs about national identity, ideology, race and ethnicity, gender, and class” served to shape “the exercise of economic, political, or military power.”³⁰

By 2004, in the midst of this shift, leading historians of United States foreign relations could claim that their field was marked by a “healthy ferment and rich diversity,” though some worried that diplomatic historians had “not done enough to hitch ourselves to this rising star” of

The Foreign Politics of American Popular Culture (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000); Greg Castillo, *Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design* (Minneapolis, 2010); Greg Barnhisel, *Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature, and American Cultural Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015); David Cauter, *The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Michael L. Krenn, *Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2005). The literature on US public diplomacy is largely focused on post-1945 events. For longer term perspectives, see Frank Ninkovitch, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Justin Hart, *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

²⁹ Cynthia Young, *Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism and the Making of a U.S. Third World Left* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Robeson Taj Frazier, *The East is Black: Cold War China in the Black Radical Imagination* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014); and Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

³⁰ Susan Brewer, “‘As Far As We Can’: Culture and US Foreign Relations,” in *A Companion to American Foreign Relations*, ed., Robert D. Schulzinger (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 17.

transnationalism and so risked getting left behind.³¹ This concern now seems quaint, but nevertheless it serves as a useful reminder to Canadian international historians. In fact, by the mid-2000s the field of American foreign relations history was in the midst of an “era of innovation” that stood in stark contrast to the dire situation of the 1980s and 1990s and to the state of Canadian international history until very recently. In 2009, while cautioning his colleagues not to abandon the “core mission of studying state-oriented diplomacy,” Tom Zeiler, SHAFR president, boasted that “diplomatic history is in the driver’s seat when it comes to the study of America and the world.”³² Harvard’s Erez Manela agreed that the field had seen welcome transformations that were “radical, perhaps unprecedented,” all the result of “a sea change in how a new generation of historians who study U.S. interactions with the wider world sees their field, and how the discipline of history as a whole views it.” Yet Manela disagreed with Zeiler about the necessity of state-centric approaches, noting that “American historians as a whole have increasingly been seeking to

³¹ Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 9; Michael J. Hogan, “The ‘Next Big Thing’: The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age,” *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (2004): 12.

³² Thomas W. Zeiler, “The Diplomatic Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” *Journal of American History* 95 (March 2009): 1053, 1072, 1055. For analyses of the historiographical and analytical changes to the field, see: Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); and Frank Costigliola and Michael J. Hogan, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, Third Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). The study of the United States in the World has also been nurtured by specialized book series: Cambridge Studies in US Foreign Relations (Cambridge University Press), The United States in the World (Cornell University Press), American Encounters/Global Interactions (Duke University Press), and America in the World (Princeton University Press). The wider field of international history has Cambridge University Press’s Global and International History series and the Oxford Studies in International History series.

transcend the nation,” with foreign relations historians “eager to frame their investigations in ways that go beyond” state boundaries.³³

And it is within this disagreement over what “counts” as international history where we see that there are methodological and theoretical gains to incorporating transnational, global, and cultural “turns” into international history as much as topical ones. As previously mentioned, orthodox international history approaches tend to reify state interests into something easily definable, based generally on “realist” v. “idealist” understandings of power, security, and economic interest. Thus the “United States” and “Canada” become personified, historical entities with identifiable places within a larger global system of states. New historical approaches, however, implicitly turn this understanding on its head because they force historians to ask who has actually made foreign policy decisions and why (taking into account, especially, larger cultural influences and social forces), which also challenges whether there really are identifiable “interests” associated with each state, how these are identified, and, critically, who gets to define them. This has created a new debate within international history circles, one that concerns how the field actually defines itself.

If one were to take a snap shot of the United States in the World it would show that what counts in the field is not just the issue of state-level decision-making but rather “the totality of interactions – economic, cultural, political, military, environmental, and more – among peoples,

³³ Erez Manela, “The United States in the World,” in Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr, eds., *American History Now* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 201, 203. See also: Kristin Hoganson, “Hop off the Bandwagon! It’s a Mass Movement, Not a Parade,” *Journal of American History* 95 (March 2009): 1087-91. In the same issue, Fred Logevall offered an important reminder of the need to analyse the domestic politics that undergird and drive foreign policy: Fredrik Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations,” *Journal of American History* 95, no. 4 (2009): 1074-78. And see: Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2009).

organizations, states, and systems.” In short, contemporary international history seemingly covers anything and everything that seeps outside of state borders, with the result that many diplomatic historians in the United States have begun to worry that there is no longer any cohesion to what they do.³⁴ As Mario Del Pero has argued, one of the risks associated with such an expansive definition is “the lack of complementarity among some of the methodological trends ... and the increasing difficulty in producing comprehensive and necessary historical syntheses” of US foreign relations history centred on state interests.³⁵ Others, like Jessica Gienow-Hecht, have disagreed, however, arguing that “the essence of the history of U.S. foreign relations ... is not primarily the state and power but citizens and any encounter with the world outside of the territorial borders of the United States. No social group should be *ex cathedra* played up or down, neither policy makers nor non-state agents.”³⁶

Although such disagreements have been far from resolved, what is clear from this commentary is that by the end of the first decade of the new millennium, the United States in the World had become the mode of categorizing a new international history, one that blends the more traditional, hard power concerns of US foreign relations with cultural and social concerns, and that also ties these issues into analyses grounded in both transnational interests in the transfusion of people and ideas and global historians’ concern with supra-national phenomena, non-governmental organizations, and large-scale developments. Such expansiveness has admittedly created new problems, as the very theoretical underpinnings of international history have been

³⁴ Merrill and Paterson, *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, xiv-xv. And see, for instance, Robert Buzzanco, “Commentary: Where’s the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 4 (2000): 623-32.

³⁵ Mario Del Pero, “On the Limits of Thomas Zeiler’s Historiographical Triumphalism,” *Journal of American History* 95 (March 2009): 1080.

³⁶ Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht, “What Bandwagon? Diplomatic History Today,” *Journal of American History* 95 (March 2009): 1086.

challenged. Still, our view is that the inclusive spirit guiding the United States in the World is a model for Canadian international historians interested in revitalizing the field. Our contention, and the point of this initiative, is that there is a need to move toward a Canada and the World approach, and happily, the move in this direction is already afoot.

Pushing International History Forward: Rethinking the Study of Canada in the World

As much as international history has been relegated to the sidelines in Canadian history, other ways of looking at Canada in the world have thrived over the course of the past two decades. The topical expansion in terms of how Canada is being thought about in global and transnational terms has begun to influence Canadian international history, but few scholars have actually queried what these three different approaches to looking at Canada have to say to each other. Moreover, and importantly for our purposes, transnational and global approaches to Canadian history have progressed largely without attention to international history approaches, an oversight in need of correction.

Canadian transnational history in particular has grown immensely over the past decade.³⁷ Although there is still a tendency among Canadian historians to be rather loose with definitions, particularly concerning the differences between transnational versus international history,³⁸ the amorphousness of what actually “counts” as transnational history means that there is a tremendously wide range of historical studies of Canada that fall under the category, from

³⁷ For a recent and more comprehensive rundown of the transnational turn in Canada, see: Karen Dubinsky, Adele Perry, and Henry Yu, eds., *Within and Without the Nation: Canadian History as Transnational History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015).

³⁸ Michael D. Behiels and Reginald C. Stuart, *Transnationalism: Canada-United States History into the 21st Century* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

migration history, to histories of the transfer of ideas and culture, to studies of religious and ethnic global communities, to borderlands studies.³⁹ Happily, transnational history and international history in Canada are increasingly starting to mix. This is essential in many ways, as both probe the degree to which borders matter, but also grapple with the question of who speaks for and influences official state positions and policies in an increasingly globalised world (though as transnational history makes clear, far flung networks and circuits of people and ideas have been a constant factor in Canada's past). As Laura Madokoro has shown, for instance, migration and refugee studies are ripe for a greater engagement with Canada's international history, as cross-border, diasporic communities have not all been treated equally by the Canadian state.⁴⁰ Along with migration, renewed attention has been focused on how peace, war, and human rights have shaped political developments within Canada and driven various forms of activism, much of it

³⁹ For a sampling of this broad range of studies, see Sean Mills, *A Place in the Sun: Haiti, Haitians, and the Remaking of Quebec* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2016); Benjamin Bryce and Alexander Freund, eds. *Entangling Migration History: Borderlands and Transnationalism in the United States and Canada* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2015); Maurice Demers, *Connected Struggles: Catholics, Nationalist, and Transnational Relations between Mexico and Québec, 1917-1945* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014); Allan Greer, "National, Transnational, and Hypernational Historiographies: New France Meets Early American History", *Canadian Historical Review* 91, no. 4 (2010), 695-724; Harvey Amani Whitfield, *Blacks on the Border: The Black Refugees in British North America, 1815-1860* (Burlington: University Press of New England, 2006); and Karen Dubinsky, *Babies Without Borders: Adoption and Migration Across the Americas* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).

⁴⁰ Laura Madokoro, "Family Reunification as International History: Rethinking Sino-Canadian Relations after 1970," *International Journal* 68 (2013), 591-608; idem., "Not All Refugees Are Created Equal: Canada Welcomes Sopron Students and Staff in 1956," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, 19, no. 1 (2008), 253-278.

having to do with refugees.⁴¹ Similar efforts have been devoted to the study of religious groups that straddle the Canada-US border, or that have strong links to their co-religionists elsewhere.⁴²

Like migrants, ideas flow across borders, and considerable attention has been spent charting trans-Atlantic currents in these areas.⁴³ This of course has a very old history, going back as least as far as J.B. Brebner's North Atlantic Triangle, and the recent popularity of such a framework speaks to the resiliency of his concept.⁴⁴ Perhaps the North Atlantic Triangle's greatest

⁴¹ Tarah Brookfield, *Cold War Comforts: Canadian Women, Child Safety, and Global Insecurity* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012); Lara Campbell, Michael Dawson and Catherine Gidney, *Worth Fighting For: Canada's Tradition of War Resistance from 1812 to the War on Terror* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2015); Jessica Squires, *Building Sanctuary: The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965-73* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); Kathleen Rodgers, *Welcome to Resisterville: American Dissidents in British Columbia* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014); David S. Churchill, "Draft Resisters, Left Nationalism, and the Politics of Anti-Imperialism", *Canadian Historical Review* 93, no. 2 (2012); Stephanie D. Bangarth, *Voices Raised in Protest: Defending Citizens of Japanese Ancestry in North America, 1942-49* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Andrew Thompson and Stephanie Bangarth, "Transnational Christian Charity: The Canadian Council of Churches, World Council of Churches, and the Hungarian Refugee Crisis, 1956-1957," *American Review of Canadian Studies* 38 (2008): 295-316; Dominique Clément, "Human Rights in Canadian Domestic and Foreign Politics: From 'Niggardly Acceptance' to Enthusiastic Embrace," *Human Rights Quarterly* 34 (2012): 751-78; and Jennifer Tunncliffe, "A Limited Vision: Canadian Participation in the Adoption of the International Covenants on Human Rights," in *Taking Liberties: A History of Human Rights in Canada*, eds., David Goutor and Stephen Heathorn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 166-89.

⁴² Marlene Epp, *Women Without Men: Mennonite Refugees of the Second World War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); and Royden K. Loewen, *Village Among Nations: 'Canadian' Mennonites in a Transnational World, 1916-2006* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).

⁴³ Cecilia Morgan, *'A Happy Holiday': English Canadians and Transatlantic Tourism, 1870-1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008); Daniel T. Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000); Nancy Christie, eds., *Transatlantic Subjects: Ideas, Identities, and Institutions in Post-Revolutionary British North America* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); Kristine Alexander, "The Girl Guide Movement and Imperial Internationalism in the 1920s and 1930s", *Journal of the History of Childhood and Youth* 2, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 37-63.

⁴⁴ C.C. Eldridge (ed.), *Kith and Kin: Canada, Britain, and the United States from the Revolution to the Cold War*, (Cardiff, 1997); B.J.C. McKercher and Lawrence Aronsen (eds.), *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World* (Toronto, 1996); C.P. Stacey, *Mackenzie King and the Atlantic Triangle* (Toronto, 1976); R.N. Kottman, *Reciprocity and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1932-1938* (Ithaca, 1968); Ian Drummond and Norman Hillmer, *Negotiating Freer Trade: The*

utility is as a comparative framework, and also as a means of exploring transnational aspects of Canada's place in the world – the very interplay to which Brebner referred. In this regard, a most unlikely user of the triangular framework (unlikely given the concept's almost exclusive use by scholars of military and diplomatic affairs) is Ian McKay, whose study of the development of socialism in Canada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made the case that "Canadians who became socialists were in effect entering a North Atlantic triangle of currents and

United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and the Trade Agreements of 1938 (Waterloo, 1989); David MacKenzie, *Inside the Atlantic Triangle: Canada and the Entrance of Newfoundland into Confederation, 1939-1949* (Toronto, 1986); Greg Kennedy, 'The North Atlantic Triangle and the Blockade, 1914-1915', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6 (2008), 22-33; Tony McCullough, 'Theodore Roosevelt and Canada: Alaska, the 'Big Stick' and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1901-1909', in *A Companion to Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Serge Ricard (Oxford, 2011); Kathleen Rasmussen, 'Old Wine, New Bottles: Canadian Economic Multilateralism and the North Atlantic Triangle, 1941-1947', in Robert Bothwell and Jean Daudelin, eds., *Canadian Among Nations 2008: 100 Years of Canadian Foreign Policy* (Montréal and Kingston, 2009), 85-110; Cara Spittal, 'The Transatlantic Romance of the North Atlantic Triangle: Narratives of Autonomy and Empire in Canadian Foreign Relations', in Bothwell and Daudelin, *Canadian Among Nations 2008*, 317-42; B.J.C. McKercher, 'The Cold War North Atlantic Triangle: Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, 1945-1990', in Antoine Capet and Aissatou Sy-Wonyu, eds., *The 'Special Relationship'* (Rouen, 2003), 137-67; Margaret MacMillan, 'Isosceles Triangle: Britain, the Dominions and the United States at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919', in Jonathan Hollowell, ed., *Twentieth-Century Anglo-American Relations* (Basingstoke, 2001), 1-24; David MacKenzie, 'Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Empire', in *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Volume 4 – The Twentieth Century*, eds., Judith Brown and W.R. Louis (Oxford, 1999), 574-96; Hector MacKenzie, 'The ABCs of Canada's International Economic Relations, 1945-1951', in Greg Donaghy (ed.), *Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957* (Ottawa, 1998), 215-50; Michael G. Fry, 'Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the United Nations', in *Suez 1956: The Crisis and Its Consequences*, (eds.) Wm Roger Louis and Roger Owen (Oxford, 1989), 285-316; Harry N. Scheiber, 'Japan, the North Atlantic Triangle, and the Pacific Fisheries: A Perspective on the Origins of Modern Ocean Law, 1930-1953', *San Diego International Law Journal* 27 (2004), 27-112; Hector MacKenzie, 'Delineating the North Atlantic Triangle: The Second World War and its Aftermath', *The Round Table* 95 (2006); *Idem.*, 'The North Atlantic Triangle and North Atlantic Treaty: A Canadian Perspective on the ABC Security Conversations of March-April 1948', *London Journal of Canadian Studies* 20 (2004/2005); *Idem.*, 'Chaff with the wheat: the Anglo-Canadian wheat contract of 1946 in its North Atlantic setting', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 6 (2008), 34-60.

ideas.”⁴⁵ One could conceivably use the triangular framework to chart a history of 1980s Canadian neoliberalism within the context of Thatcherism and Reaganism, or to analyze Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s policies in the 1990s and early 2000s with reference to the Clinton-Blair ‘Third Way’, or to look at how Canadian popular culture in the 1960s was affected, or not, by the sounds of American film, television, and rock ‘n’ roll and the swinging style of Carnaby Street.

As Henry Yu has argued, however, “Canada is as much a Pacific-oriented as it is an Atlantic-oriented nation,” a view that is not necessarily geographic but, rather, one that offers “a perspective on our past” that challenges the Central Canadian dominance of national history, which is frequently looks east rather than west.⁴⁶ Similarly, John Price has pointed out that a focus on Europe “marginalizes Asia, not to mention Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean.”⁴⁷ Although Canadian-Asian relations have a relatively longer, albeit still rather recent, place within Canadian international historiography, more attention has been devoted to Pacific Canada and recent histories have begun to catch up with what was once considered an outlying area of Canadian international history.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Ian McKay, *Reasoning Otherwise: Leftists and the People’s Enlightenment in Canada, 1890-1920* (Toronto, 2008), 520. For similar uses, see: J.L. Finlay, *Canada in the North Atlantic Triangle: Two Centuries of Social Change* (Oxford, 1975); J.R. Miller, “Bigotry in the North Atlantic Triangle: Irish, British and American Influences on Canadian anti-Catholicism 1850-1900”, *Studies in Religion* (1987), 289-301; the forum on “The New British History in Atlantic Perspective”, *American Historical Review* 104 (1999), 426-500; Wayne Nelles, “Citizen Diplomacy, Internationalism, and Anglo-American Educational Relations, 1919-1946: Canada in a ‘North Atlantic Triangle’,” *International Journal of Canadian Studies* 22 (2000), 135-62.

⁴⁶ Henry Yu, “Refracting Pacific Canada: Seeing Our Uncommon Past,” *BC Studies* no. 156/157 (Winter/Spring 2007/08), 5.

⁴⁷ John Price, *Orienting Canada: Race, Empire, and the Transpacific* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 2.

⁴⁸ Older studies include: Steven Lee, “Canadian-Asian Experience: An Introductory Synthesis,” *Journal of American-East-Asian Relations*. 4.3 (1995): 193-222; Paul M. Evans and Michael Frolic, eds. *Reluctant Adversaries: Canada and the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1970* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991); Alvin Austin, *Saving China: Canadian Missionaries in the Middle Kingdom 1888-1959* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986). For new studies,

The Pacific has also played an important part in histories about Canadian links to other parts of the former British empire, with Australia and New Zealand in particular taking primacy of place.⁴⁹ One is tempted to note that the empire has struck back, for imperial history has come into its own. Although Canadian history has always involved the study of empires, as Phillip Buckner lamented more than a decade ago, this focus, especially as it pertained to the British empire, seemed to disappear in the closing decades of the twentieth century. By the late 1990s and early twentieth century, however, partly in response to Buckner but also as part of a larger, critical re-engagement with the history of the British empire more generally, Canada and the British World emerged as a vibrant area of study looking both at the colonial period and its legacies.⁵⁰

As for other transnational trends closer to home, borderlands studies have added nuance to the tried and true study of Canadian-US history, with a particular focus on non-political themes

see: John Meehan, *The Dominion and the Rising Sun: Canada Encounters Japan, 1929-1941* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); John Meehan, *Chasing the Dragon: Shanghai and Canada's Early Relations with China, 1858-1952* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011); Greg Donaghy and Patricia E. Roy, *Contradictory Impulses: Canada and Japan in the Twentieth Century* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008); Kornel Chang, *Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.-Canadian Borderlands* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

⁴⁹ Margaret MacMillan and Francine McKenzie, eds, *Parties Long Estranged: Canada and Australia in the 20th Century* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003); Lisa Chilton, *Agents of Empire: British Female Migration to Canada and Australia, 1860s-1930* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

⁵⁰ A.G. Hopkins. "Rethinking Decolonization", *Past and Present* 200 (2008), 211-47; Philip Buckner, ed. *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005); C.P. Champion, *The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 1964-1968* (Montréal and Kingston, 2010); Katie Pickles, *Female Imperialism and National Identity: Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Phillip Buckner, ed., *Canada and the British World: Culture, Migration and Identity* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006); Idem., ed., *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); Leigh Boucher, Jane Carey and Katherine Ellinghaus eds., *Re-Orienting Whiteness* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Kate Darian-Smith, Patricia Grimshaw, Stuart Macintyre, *Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 2007).

and non-state based connections.⁵¹ A prime example of this work is the focus on the so-called rust belt that runs through Canada and the United States, connecting labour, technology, and economy in a fashion that is both influenced by Canadian-US borders and also transcends them.⁵² There has also been an increasing interest in regions that straddle the border, most notably in works by Theodore Binnema, William G. Robbins and Katrine Barber, Paul Hirt, and Lissa Wadewitz, all of whom use natural borders rather than political ones to delimit their studies while also examining the environmental impact of such boundaries.⁵³ There have also been important continental approaches to North America that include Canada, the United States, and Mexico, most notably Sterling Evans' work.⁵⁴ Such efforts have paralleled an increasing interest in borderlands history between Canada and the United States more generally, particularly in the West.⁵⁵ All of this work

⁵¹ John Herd Thompson and Stephen Randall's survey of Canadian-American relations, for example, in addition to the standard political and economic approach, includes general examinations of Canadian-American labour, media, sports, and environmental relationships, including the many non-governmental actors that such activities have involved: John Herd Thompson and Steven J. Randall, Fourth Edition, *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008). More recent works by Robert Bothwell and Stephen Azzi have made a valuable contribution by looking not only at the Canada-US relationship but at Canadian and United States history in parallel: Robert Bothwell, *Your Country, My Country: A Unified History of the United States and Canada* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Stephen Azzi, *Reconcilable Differences: A History of Canada-US Relations* (Don Mills: Oxford University Press Canada, 2015).

⁵² Steven High, *Industrial Sunset: The Making of North America's Rust Belt* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003); Tracy Neumann, *Remaking the Rust Belt: The Postindustrial Transformation of North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016).

⁵³ Theodore Binnema, *Common and Contested Ground: A Human and Environmental History of the Northwestern Plains* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); William G. Robbins and Katrine Barber, *Nature's Northwest: The North Pacific Slope in the Twentieth Century* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2011); Hirt, *Wired Northwest*; Lissa K. Wadewitz, *The Nature of Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).

⁵⁴ Sterling Evans, *Bound in Twine: The History and Ecology of the Henequen-Wheat Complex for Mexico and the American and Canadian Plains, 1880 – 1950* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007).

⁵⁵ See, for example, Stephen T. Moore, *Bootleggers and Borders: The Paradox of Prohibition on a Canada-U.S. Borderland* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2014); Benjamin Johnson and Andrew Greybill, eds., *Bridging National Borders in North American Transnational and*

shows that Canadian-US histories are enmeshed, and while there are distinct national histories, one can identify an intertwined North American history, though American historians' continental focus in the transnational turn has mainly been on Mexico.⁵⁶

Also at the borderlands level, environmental historians have increasingly started to look at the confluence of international relations and the impact of non-human nature that does not adhere to national borders, a relatively new field in international history more broadly.⁵⁷ Canadian-U.S. relations loom large here, as Kurkpatrick Dorsey and Daniel Macfarlane's works have shown.⁵⁸ The Arctic borderlands have also received an increasing amount of attention as well, particularly from Petra Dolata and Whitney Lackenbauer, who posit that, thanks to the circumpolar north, conceptions of Canada's borderlands need to be expanded to include Greenland, Russia, the Scandinavian bloc, and Asia.⁵⁹

Comparative Histories (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Sterling Evans ed., *The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays on Regional History of the Forty-Ninth Parallel* (Lincoln, 2006); John M. Findley and Ken S. Coates, eds., *Parallel Destinies: Canadian-American Relations West of the Rockies* (Seattle, 2002); Paul W. Hirt (ed.), *Terra Pacifica: People and Place in the Northwest States and Western Canada* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1998); John J. Bukowczyk, "The Permeable Border, the Great Lakes Region, and the Canadian-American Relationship," *Michigan Historical Review* 34, no. 2 (2008), 1-16.

⁵⁶ Special issues of the *Journal of American History* on "Rethinking History and the Nation State: Mexico and the United States" (vol. 86, September 1999) and "The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History" (vol. 86, December 1999); and Ian Tyrrell, "Reflections on the Transnational Turn in United States History: Theory and Practice," *Journal of Global History* 4 (2009), 453-74. But also: Benjamin H. Johnson and Andrew R. Graybill, eds., *Bridging Borders in North America: Transnational and Comparative Histories* (Durham, 2010).

⁵⁷ Kurkpatrick Dorsey, "Dealing with the Dinosaur (and its Swamp): Putting the Environment in Diplomatic History," *Diplomatic History*, 29, 4, (2005): 573 – 87; Kurk Dorsey and Mark Lytle, eds., "Special Issue on the Environment," *Diplomatic History* 32, 4 (September 2008); Joseph E. Taylor III, "Boundary Terminology," *Environmental History* 13 (July 2008): 454-481.

⁵⁸ Kurkpatrick Dorsey, *The Dawn of Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era* (Washington: University of Washington Press, 1998); Daniel Macfarlane, *Negotiating A River: Canada, the U.S., and the St. Lawrence Seaway* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014).

⁵⁹ Petra Dolata, "How Green is Canada's Arctic Policy? The Role of the Environment and Environmental Security in the Arctic," *Zeitschrift für Kanada-Studien*, 32, no. 2 (2012), 65-83; P.

Another aspect of the recent surge in the study of the emergent field of Canada in the World has been the emphasis on decolonization and development, two increasingly prominent themes in Canadian international history. Ruth Compton Brouwer's *Canada's Global Villagers* looks at the Canadian University Service Overseas, its activities overseas, and the impact that it had on domestic political activism. Analysing a different type of Canadian engagement with development, in *The Other Cold War*, Christopher Kilford has explored the Canadian military's involvement in military assistance programs in Africa and Asia. Both studies are a welcome addition to the growing academic literature surrounding Canadian development specifically, and relations with the 'Third World' more generally.⁶⁰ Similarly, Tamara Myers has connected conceptions of poverty, race, youth, and development initiatives in the decolonizing Third World through international fundraising initiatives like walkathons.⁶¹ Meanwhile, David Meren, Magali Deleuze, and Sean Mills, have probed the multifaceted impact of decolonization on Quebec, as well as at the France-Quebec-Canada triangle.⁶²

Whitney Lackenbauer, "Polar Race or Polar Saga? Canada and the Circumpolar World," in James Kraska, ed., *Arctic Security in an Age of Climate Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 218-43; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Matthew Farish, "The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment," *Environmental History* 12, no. 3 (2007), 920-50; and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Franklyn Griffiths, and Rob Huebert, *Canada and the Changing Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship* (Waterloo: Wilfred Laurier Press, 2011).

⁶⁰ Ruth Compton Brouwer, *Canada's Global Villagers: CUSO in Development, 1961-86* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013); and Christopher R. Kilford, *The Other Cold War: Canada's Military Assistance to the Developing World 1945-1975* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010). See also Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, *Canada and the Third World: Overlapping Histories* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).

⁶¹ Tamara Myers, "Local Action and Global Imagining: Youth, International Development, and the Walkathon Phenomenon in Sixties' and Seventies' Canada", *Diplomatic History* 38:2 (April 2014): 282-93.

⁶² Magali Deleuze, *L'une et l'autre indépendance. Les médias au Québec et la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1964)* (Montréal, Point de Fuite, 2001); David Meren, "An Atmosphere of *Libération*: The Role of Decolonization in the France-Quebec Rapprochement of the 1960s," *Canadian Historical Review* 92 (2011); David Meren, *With Friends Like These: Entangled Nationalisms and the*

Focusing on Canada's relationships with decolonizing countries has meant that historians of Canada's international relations have begun to look beyond the North Atlantic, and, in breaking out of this traditional ground, they have reached new conclusions about the nature of Canadian foreign policy. Those more traditionally-minded historians, interested in Canada's relationships with Britain and with the United States, had concentrated largely on questions of Canadian autonomy and independence, as well as on the extent of Canada's influence with its Great Power guarantors. These issues are still relevant to the new scholarship. But in looking at Canadian relations with the non-Western world, particularly in the period after the wave of post-1945 decolonization, Robin Gendron, David Webster, Kevin Spooner, Michael Carroll, and Ryan Touhey have posed other questions about Canada's global engagement.⁶³ Often, they have drawn troubling conclusions, especially once cultural factors and economic power have been thrown into the mix. Canada, these scholars have reminded us, is a Western country, with policymakers who thought in Western terms. The point is worth stressing because many Canadians had – and have – seemingly bought too much into the rhetoric that Canada is a nation of mild-mannered, tolerant honest brokers and peacekeepers. Still, as Ryan Touhey has shown in his study of Canada-India

Canada-Quebec-France Triangle (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012); Sean Mills, *The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought and Political Activism in Sixties Montreal* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010).

⁶³ Robin S. Gendron, *Towards a Francophone Community: Canada's Relations with France and French Africa, 1945-1968* (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006); David Webster, *Fire and the Full Moon: Canada and Indonesia in a Decolonizing World* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); Kevin Spooner, *Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-1964* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); Michael K. Carroll, *Pearson's Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-67* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009); Ryan Touhey, "Dealing in Black and White: The Diefenbaker Government and the Cold War in South Asia 1957-1963," *Canadian Historical Review* 92 (2011): 429-54.

relations, Canadians took seriously the notion that they could act as a bridge between the West and the rest in a decolonizing world.⁶⁴

But imperial aspects of international history are not only related to Canada's relationships with areas outside of its borders. Indeed, international historians need to do a better job of looking at the relationship between international relations and imperialism as it relates to the history of the Canadian state and First Nations, Inuit, and Métis. Although transnational and global historians have made great inroads on topics as diverse as Louis Riel, Indigenous rights movements, and the comparative impact of settler societies, Canadian-First Nations relations are rarely thought about as part of Canada's international history, outside of Indigenous history circles.⁶⁵ As Canada's treaty history with First Nations communities has shown, however, this was not how actors in the past have necessarily viewed it.⁶⁶ Within Canada, such an interpretation would drastically alter the timeline of Canadian international relations, which is commonly interpreted as beginning after the First World War. Furthermore, addressing indigenous history within international relations would force Canadian international historians to re-analyze concepts such as sovereignty and would blur the boundary between foreigner and citizen, something that indigenous groups, as "citizens plus," have been doing for a long time. This has been most dramatically illuminated by repetitive instances of Indigenous groups taking complaints against the Canadian government before

⁶⁴ Ryan Touhey, *Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946-76* (Vancouver, 2015).

⁶⁵ Geoff Read and Todd Webb, "'The Catholic Mahdi of the North West': Louis Riel and the Metis Resistance in Transatlantic and Imperial Context," *Canadian Historical Review* 93, no. 2 (2012): 171-95; Scott Rutherford, "Canada's Other Red Scare: Rights, Decolonization, and Indigenous Political Protest in the Global Sixties" (PhD diss., Queen's University, 2011); Penelope Edmonds, *Urbanizing Frontiers: Indigenous Peoples and Settlers in 19th-Century Pacific Rim Cities* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 2010).

⁶⁶ J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000 [1991]); Idem., *Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).

international bodies, such as the League of Nations, the British government, and the United Nations.⁶⁷

And this leads us to the larger questions within international history more broadly to which Canadian international historians are primed to contribute. We will pose two of them here, both of which we believe are imperative to rethinking international history in Canada. First, how do we define Canada's central international "interests" throughout its first century-and-a-half of existence? There is no easy answer to this question, and it is most certainly something that shifts over time. Indeed, if anything, it only leads to larger questions. If, as stated above, the state is no longer the sole, and perhaps not even the central, maker of international policy for Canada, then how do we determine who has been able to define "Canada's" interests and when? How have domestic politics, such as Canada's different regional, social, and political relationships affected foreign policy and at what times? To what degree have the interests of transnational groups like corporations, religions, activist networks, and immigrant communities (to name only a few) shaped Canadian relationships with each other and with other nation states? To what degree have "traditional" international relationships, such as those with the Atlantic triangle been challenged by Canada's Pacific, Latin American, African, or circumpolar relationships? What defined Canada's twentieth century – its imperial relationships, the Cold War, decolonization, its role in creating the global governance institutions like the UN – and how did its domestic mix of social, cultural, and environmental change impact such larger forces?

Second, what makes Canadian international history unique (or not), compared to the

⁶⁷ Richard Veatch, *Canada and the League of Nations* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), chapter 7; J.R. Miller, "Petitioning the Great White Mother: First Nations' Organizations and Lobbying in London," in Phillip Buckner, *Canada and the End of Empire* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 299-318.

international history of other countries? As some historians have stressed, American exceptionalism has come to dominate the study of international history, and recent developments, including this initiative, represents a challenge to “America-centric international history” and form part of a wider effort to “decenter the United States in the history of culture and international relations.”⁶⁸ On the one hand, Canada’s twentieth century closely mirrors that of the United States, with a similar shift from isolationism to internationalism after the Second World War, a spreading of “western” cultural, imperial, and capitalist experiences to other countries, and the acceptance, often grudgingly, of large racialized migrant groups. But there are also key differences. First and foremost is the difference in power and influence: the United States spent the twentieth century as a Great Power, with immense influence internationally, both in terms of hard power but also soft power; Canada, at best, was a middle power, a fraught and heavily debated term.⁶⁹ Certainly, too, a main difference is that Canada’s relationship with Britain looms large, as does its concomitant membership in the British Commonwealth. The presence of Quebec and Canada’s history with the global French empire and community of nations is the other immediately recognizable difference that separates Canada’s international history from that of the United States not to mention much

⁶⁸ Fredrik Logevall, “Politics and Foreign Relations,” *Journal of American History* 95 (2009), 1076; Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Decentering America* (Oxford, 2007), 1. And see: Akira Iriye, “Internationalizing International History,” in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed., T. Bender (Berkeley, 2002) 47-62; Nicholas Barreyre, Michael Heale, Stephen Tuck and Cécile Vidal, *Historians Across Borders: Writing American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, 2014); Ian Tyrrell, “American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History,” *American Historical Review* 96 (1991), 1031-55.

⁶⁹ See: Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” *International Journal* 55, no. 2 (2000), 188-206. And see the related debate about the ‘golden age’ of Canadian foreign policy: Cohen, *While Canada Slept*; Greg Donaghy, “Coming off the Gold Standard: Re-assessing the “Golden Age” of Canadian Diplomacy,” Paper presented to the symposium *A Very Modern Ministry: Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada*, University of Saskatchewan, 28 September 2009; Hector MacKenzie, “Golden Decade(s)? Reappraising Canada’s International Relations in the 1940s and 1950s,” *British Journal of Canadian Studies* 23 (2010), 179-206; Don Munton, “Myths of the Golden Age,” *Canadian Foreign Policy* (2005), 175-7.

of the world. A third dynamic that differentiates Canada is the vast amount of what has so often been perceived of as “empty” territory in the variously defined northern reaches of the country, with a history of natural resource wealth and export dependency that followed. Taken together, it would seem that even what can be considered as the “state” in Canada has changed dramatically over time, given the imperial realities of its British past, the presence of Quebec, the proximity of the United States, and Canada’s relationship with its Indigenous communities.

Neither of these broad questions are easily answered, nor is it our intention to do so here. Rather, they are meant to point out that if what David Meren has identified as “a long-overdue rapprochement between history’s various sub-disciplines ... bringing ‘history from below’ into productive and critical conversation with those individuals, institutions, and forces boasting a privileged position within the Canadian project of rule and linked to its international action” is in fact in the process of happening, then it also needs to be done in a way that considers theoretical underpinnings and implications as much as topical breadth.⁷⁰ The contributors to this collection have sought to provide their own thoughts and guidance on this matter, and to provide a path forward for Canadian international history.

For too long, developments in transnational and global history in Canada happened without the input of international historians. This stagnation is of concern for two different reasons. As Adam Chapnick has pointed out “the relative paucity of scholarship on the history of foreign relations has resulted in a dearth of contrasting views” within the small cohort of Canadian international historians, many of whom seemed concerned first and foremost with self-preservation rather than with engaging in internecine debates.⁷¹ Furthermore, the mutual ignorance

⁷⁰ Meren, “Tragedies”, 565-6.

⁷¹ Chapnick, “Where Have All of Canada’s Diplomatic Historians Gone?,” 732.

of Canadian social and cultural historians and Canadian international historians meant that few critical perspectives seeped into the history of Canadian international history. In turn, this lack of debate failed to enliven interchange among historians let alone student reading lists and international history was relegated to the sidelines of most Canadian history departments or not ignored altogether (this despite the subject's popularity with undergraduate students). Thankfully there are many signs that such a separation of spheres is finally ending, and that rich debates about Canada's role in the world are increasingly being heard.⁷² It is this momentum that this initiative seeks to promote and push forwards, in the hopes that Canadian international history can revitalize itself by blending more traditional diplomatic concerns, with transnational, global, and cultural issues as well as a multiplicity of viewpoints.

⁷² Critical views that seemingly form the nucleus of a revisionist school have recently been advanced in: Robert Teigrob, *Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); and Karen Dubinsky, Sean Mills, and Scott Rutherford, *Canada and the Third World: Overlapping Histories* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016).